Did the Duke of Cumberland introduce a new bayonet drill before Culloden?

Many narratives of the battle of Culloden mention the new bayonet drill, but was one introduced to Cumberland's infantry battalions?

Numerous histories of the Battle of Culloden reference the Duke of Cumberland’s purportedly new bayonet drill which was allegedly introduced in his infantry battalions during their six-week encampment in Aberdeen and Strathbogie before the decisive confrontation with the Jacobites on Culloden Moor on 16 April 1746. This assertion, however, was discredited merely months after it was initially presented.

In a letter published in the April 1746 edition of The Scots Magazine, a soldier who claimed to have fought at Culloden under Cumberland mentioned a new method of using the bayonet to combat the Jacobite highlanders who were armed with sword and targe. This account of the battle and the innovative bayonet tactic has been retold in various histories of the battle ever since:

Rather than confronting the adversary directly in front of them, each soldier would direct his bayonet towards the enemy advancing on the soldier to his right. Consequently, each soldier would need to depend on the man to their left for protection. This tactic would be unfeasible in the chaos of battle. With a throng of Jacobite highlanders charging towards them, Cumberland’s troops would struggle to identify their targets, and there would be no assurance that the Jacobites would approach the bayonets in a manner conducive to being effectively engaged.

After reviewing the evidence and hearing from an officer who stated that no changes had been made in the use of the bayonet, the November 1746 edition of The Scots Magazine published a retraction of the earlier letter stating that: “We are likewise informed, that there is no foundation for what is said… of an alteration having been made in the manner of using the bayonet.”2

While Cumberland did not introduce a new method for the bayonet he did order his soldiers to undergo rigorous training in the standard bayonet drill to ensure they would have the confidence to stand and not panic when faced with a highland charge. By presenting a hedge of bayonets and thrusting them forward at chest height, the soldiers would have had an effective defence against any Jacobites who reached their lines.

The extended reach of the bayonet in comparison to the broadsword rendered it an essential weapon in this context. The soldiers’ confidence in their training and their capacity to unite and avert the panic experienced at Prestonpans, and to a lesser degree at Falkirk, was crucial for success. The highland charge was as much a psychological tactic as it was a physical assault, aimed at instilling fear in the enemy, prompting them to flee, whereupon they would be mercilessly cut down by the highlanders’ blades. Should the opposing forces choose to remain steadfast rather than retreat, the likelihood of the charge’s success would diminish significantly.

The standard drill for charging and pushing the bayonet was laid down in Major-General Humphrey Bland’s 1743 edition of A Treatise of Military Discipline and was as follows:

Daniel Hamilton a grenadier in Barrell’s regiment recalled the training that the infantry battalions went through while at Aberdeen and Strathbogie in March-April 1746: “the grenadiers attack the battalion, in exercising, with their broad swords, to, convince the men of the superiority of the bayonets”.4 He makes no mention of an alteration to the standard bayonet drill.

A British grenadier charging his bayonet by William Baillie c.1753

In testimony to the bayonet training, Barrell’s and Munro’s regiments on Cumberland’s left-wing at Culloden stood their ground when, due to the nature of the terrain funneling the Jacobites to the right, the main assault fell upon them. With sheer weight in numbers the Jacobites “broke in between the grenadiers of Barrel and Monro; but these had given their fire according to the general direction, and then parried them with their screwed bayonets”.5  An account by a corporal in Munro’s regiment stated: “the Front Rank charged their Bayonets Breast high, and the Centre and Rear Ranks kept a continual Firing”. Again there is no mention of a new bayonet technique being employed.

Barrell’s and Munro’s regiments fought the Jacobites in brutal hand-to-hand fighting before being supported by elements of Cumberland’s second line standing behind them. “There was scarce a soldier or officer of Barrels, or of that part of Monro’s which engaged, which did not kill one or two men with their bayonets or spontoons.”6 Cumberland himself wrote three days after the battle: “our men fairly beat them back with their bayonets, and made a great slaughter of them.”7

An account from an officer writing from Inverness just days after the battle highlighted the importance of the bayonet training:

Another account written five days after the battle stated:

Cumberland’s own letters, dispatches and order book makes no mention of a new bayonet drill being introduced, however, there is mention of a modified platoon firing drill specifically developed to demolish the highland charge before it came to the use of cold steel. On 2 April 1746, Cumberland issued orders for the Royal Scots Fusiliers “to be out in the Park tomorrow at 11 o’clock there to practice the motions of alternate firings by platoons from ye right and left to ye centre reserving fire of ye front rank and Grenadiers.”10

David Morier’s iconic painting An Incident in the Rebellion of 1745 depicts the grenadiers of Barrell’s regiment engaging in close quarters with Jacobite highlanders at Culloden. The painting was commissioned by Cumberland in 1753 and shows the grenadiers – with the exception of the officer – charging their bayonets breast high according to the standard drill.

Even if a new bayonet drill had been implemented, it would have been impractical for another frequently overlooked reason. Prior to the battle, many of the Jacobite highlanders had discarded their targes, and only a small number were equipped with broadswords. Among the approximately 1,500 Jacobite dead and wounded, fewer than 200 broadswords were recovered from the battlefield. While the clan gentry and officers positioned at the front of the main Jacobite line would have been armed with broadswords, the vast majority of the Jacobite forces – both highlanders and lowlanders – were armed with muskets.11

Notes:

  1. The Scots Magazine, 1746, vol 8, p. 192. ↩︎
  2. Ibid, p. 524. ↩︎
  3. Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 5th ed, London 1743; Bland was the British Army’s tactician and served at Culloden under Cumberland. ↩︎
  4. Observations on Mr Home’s Account of the Battle of Culloden, 1802. ↩︎
  5. Andrew Henderson, The Life of William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, 1766, p. 255. ↩︎
  6. The History of the Rebellion Raised Against His Majesty King George II, 1745p. 44. ↩︎
  7. Letter from Cumberland to Lord Loudoun, 19 April 1746, Cumberland Papers, Royal Archives. ↩︎
  8. John Marchant, The History of the Present Rebellion, 1746, p. 397 ↩︎
  9. Ibid. p. 396. ↩︎
  10. Nottingham University, Hallward Library, Galway Collection, GA 12835, quoted in: David Blackmore’s Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642 – 1765, p. 111. ↩︎
  11. Return of Ordnance taken at Culloden, Cumberland Papers, Royal Archives. ↩︎

Cite this article: Ritchie, N. S. (15 February 2025). Did the Duke of Cumberland introduce a new bayonet drill before Culloden? Jacobite Wars. https://www.jacobitewars.com/articles/duke-of-cumberland-new-bayonet-drill/

Neil Ritchie
Neil Ritchie
Neil Ritchie is the founder and editor of JacobiteWars.com. Neil has a keen interest in the military history of Scotland and in particular the military history of the Jacobite risings. He is also the editor of other online publications covering Scottish history and defence matters. Neil can be found on Bluesky: @neilritchie.bsky.social